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26 PENAAT V. STATE BAR [25 C.2d 
It is deemed inappropriate to decide in this proceeding 
the question of law thus presented to the commissioner. The 
solution of it one way or the other would not determine this 
application. [1] The question here is whether the defend-
ants have made out a case for the issuance of the writ. The 
showing made discloses an attempt in good faith to prevent 
execution on the judgment. pending the appeal by the filing 
of the required bond and that the sureties on the bond pre-
sented for that purpose have sufficiently justified. 
The writ of supersedeas should therefore issue as prayed 
upon the approval of an undertaking in the sum of $2,050 
by the judge who tried the case or by the Presiding Judge 
of the Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County within 
forty days from and after the filing of this order. The bond 
heretofore filed and on which the sureties have been examined 
and justified may constitute such bond upon agreement of the 
sureties and approval by the court. 
It is so ordered. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Tray-
nor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
[So F. No. 17016. In Bank. Oct. 20, 1944.J 
WILLIAM H. PENAAT, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR 
OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. 
[1] Attorneys-Suspension-Evidence_Presenting False Appli-
cation.-In a disciplinary proceeding, the evidence Supported 
a finding of the Board of Governors that the attorney pre-
pared and filed with the Division of Corporations a verified 
application for a certificate to solicit contingent fee contracts 
containing material allegations which he knew to be false, 
where, assuming there was actually a league of claimants, or 
an executive committee of said league, for which the attorney 
was .retained as counsel, the committee members mentioned 
in the application as having consulted with and been advised 
by his law firm had never met him personally or consulted 
with him or his firm. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,4] Attorneys, § 172(9); [3] Attor-
neys, § 140. 
t 
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[2a,2b] Id.-Suspension-Evidence-Fraudulent Conduct Towards 
Client.-The evidence supported a finding of the Board of 
Governors that an attorney, retained by a league of claimants 
of an insolvent association on a contingent fee basis, had. 
intended to deceive said claimants into believing that certain 
Supreme Court decisions in representative suits, instituted by. 
other claimants, were due to his own written efforts or· active 
participation in said litigation, where, in addition to his. state-
ment that the "Supreme Court has finally sustained our posi-
tion," representations had previously been made, on soUcita-
tioD of members, that the purpose of thelea,,"1le was "to press 
their claims in a similar suit," and where he did nothing 
other than to follow the course of pending litigation. 
[3] ld.-Suspension-Failure to Advise Clients as to Double Lia-
bility for Fees.-An attorney for a league of claimants of an 
insolvent association who was either initially aware. of the 
prayer for and award of counsel fees to attorneys of record 
in representative actions instituted by other claimants, or was 
specifically advised of such fees by a letter written by the 
Corporation Commissioner, should have advised the league 
members, who were subject to liability for. such fees, ~hat they. 
would have to pay the fees in the representative actions in ad-
dition to his fee, and his failure so to advise said members 
constituted cause for disciplinary action against him. 
[4] ld. - Suspension - Evidence - Misconduct With Respect to 
Fees.-The evidence supported a finding of the Board of Gov-
ernors that an attorney for a league of claimants of an insol-
vent association attempted to compel the payment of legal fees 
by two claimants who had not signed subscription agreements 
or otherwise become obligated either to the league or to him, 
where it appeared that when one of the claimants and a friend 
called on the attorney they merely told him that they would 
let him know later, and that they thereafer agreed that he 
did not have as much to offer as anoth~r group of claimants. 
PROCEEDING to review a recommendation· of suspension 
of an attorney for six months. Petitioner suspended for six . 
months. 
LeoR .. Friedman for Petitioner. 
JeroldE. Weil for Respondent. 
THE COURT.-Petitioner seeks a review and the dismissal 
of a disciplinary proceeding wherein it has been recommended 
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that he be suspended from the practice of the law in this 
state for a period of six months. 
The charges are based upon petitioner's alleged solicitation 
and purported representation under contingent fee contracts 
of a group or league of claimants of an insolvent building and 
loan association. The Board of Governors concluded. as 
ground for suspension, first, that petitioner solicited one 
claimant in violation of rule 2 of the Rules of Professional 
conduct, and second, that petitioner violated his' oath and dutiesa~ an attorney and committed acts involving moral 
turpitude in: (a) attempting to collect from two claimants 
legal fees which petitioner knew were not owing to him or to 
the league for which he was acting as attorney; ,(b) sending 
the claimants letters by which petitioner intended to deceive 
in certain particulars; (c) failing to advise three claimants 
from whom petitioner collected fees that in addition to such 
compensation they were liable for fees awarded by the court 
to attorneys of record in representative actions; and (d) pre-
paring and filing with the State Corporation Division a veri~ 
fied application for a certificate to solicit contingent fee con-
tracts containing material allegations which petitioner knew 
to be untrue and misleading. 
In 1933 there had been filed on behalf of a group of share 
claimants of an insolvent building and loan association, cer-
tain actions designed to establish their right to share, with 
holders of investment certificates, in liquidating dividends. 
Trial of the causes in 1935 resulted in a judgment for plain-
tiffs, from which an appeal was taken. (See Martin v. Oali-
fornia Mut. B. & L. Assn., 18 Cal.2d 478 [116 P.2d.71].) As 
these Martin actions were not representative, in the year 1937 
another g:::,oup of claimants retained L. H. Schell bach , et al., 
as counsel, to institute representative suits in behalf of them-
selves and all others similarly situated, for the purpose of 
establishing their right to share in liquidating dividends. (See 
Adams v. Oalifornia Mut. B. & L. Assn., and Byl v. Oalifornia 
Mut. B. & L. Assn., 18 Cal.2d 487 [116 P.2d. 75].) About this 
same time one Charles E. Betts told petitioner that he owned 
a passbook representing a deposit in the association; that a 
friend, Flynn, was also the owner of a passbook, and that 
Flynn's sister, Jean Dixon, was a depositor. He proposed the 
formation of a committee which would be represented by peti-
tioner for the purpose of establishing claims against the asso-
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ciation. About June 1, 1937, he purportedly joined. with 
Flynn and Dixon in the organization of the Building and 
Loan Investors' League, and in .the formation of a so-called 
executive committee' of that league.' .' _ 
Petitioner was informed by Flynn and Betts that he was 
retained as counsel for the league and he accepted that eni~ . 
ployment. He never met Jean Dixon. Upon information 
supplied by Flynn and· Betts he prepared the documents he 
deemed necessary to express the purposes of the league and a 
. subscription agreement whereby those joining would agree 
to pay a sum equal to 5 per cent of their shares in the associa-
tion to cover expenses of the league, and an additional 15 per 
cent as counsel fees in the event of recovery. The organizers 
were to have their own claims handled free of charge and were' 
to receive 2% per cent of the initial 5 per cent payments, peti-
tioner to retain the other 2% per cent.' , 
The league, if it actually existed, was never a bona fide or~ 
ganization of holders of membership shares in the 1lssociation. 
Betts had no interest in any membership share. Flynn was a 
security broker who acquired certificates only by transfer. 
His sister, Jean Dixon, worked in his office and the shares 
standing in her name were assigned to her in April, 1936, and 
assigned by her to one Lee not later than October 29, 1931 .. 
The so-called managing body or executive committee of the 
league was said to consist of Dixon, Mrs. White and, Miss Mary , 
S. L. Wilson, of "c/o Anna Head School, 2538 Channing 
Avenue, Berkeley." The Miss Wilson at that address never 
had anything to do with the association or parties here in-
volved. Another Miss Wilson of Berkeley, had been solicited, 
by letter, had called at petitioner's office with a friend, and 
had left without joining the league. Mrs. White was. a deposi-
tor in the association, but she never. heard of the league or 
executive committee until about the time of distribution of 
dividends when she received a letter from the commissioner 
advising her that petitioner claimed a fee. Flynn testified . 
that Mrs. White's husband had authorized the use of her 
name. 
. So far as shown no meeting of the league or of the executive 
committee was ever held, no officers were elected, and no pro~ 
ceedings were taken other than the things done by Betts and 
petitioner. The Board of Governors found that the league was 
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but that petitioner "did not know that said league and said 
committee were not bona fide." 
After the purported organization of the league, Betts con-
tinued his work of solicitation, sending out letters from peti-
tioner's San Francisco address, although he also maintained 
his own office in San Jose. [1] In ,January, 1938, pursuant 
to the enactment in 1937 of the Security Owners' Protection 
Law (Stats. 1937, p. 2232, Deering's Gen. Laws, p. 1787, 
Act 3815), petitioner prepared and filed with the Division of 
Corporations, an application signed and verified by Dixon for 
a certificate of authorization for contingent fee contracts so-
licited and to be solicited. This application recited that the 
executive committee of the league was composed of Dixon, 
White and Miss Wilson of the Head School, all of whom held 
approved claims against the association; that Dixon and 
vYhite had consulted petitioner's law firm; that the firm had 
recommended to them that they institute an action to protect 
their rights; that since such a proceeding would be rather 
expensive they determined to affiliate other claimants simi-
larly situated; that with this in mind they formed the league, 
sought and received the cooperation of other claimants, and 
retained petitioner's firm as counsel on a contingent fee of 
20 pel' cent of the ultimate recovery. The commissioner re-
fused to issue a certificate on the ground that he was unable 
to find that the proposed plan was not "unfair, unjust, or in-
equitable,'" and would not "work a fraud" upon purchasers. 
The recitals of the application, the Board of Governors found, 
were "material and were false and were known to [petitioner] 
to be false," in many material respects. This finding, under 
the evidence, is correct. Assuming that there actually was a 
league, or an executive committee, or that petitioner actually 
believed in their existence, it 'was a fact, which he knew, that 
neither Dixon nor 'Vhite had ever met him personally or con-
sulted with him or his law firm. For an attorney to properly 
give advice to clients relative to the formation of a league, 
and the committee of a league, and its affiliation of other mem-
bers, the attorney should know who his clients are, and not 
misrepresent to the Corporation Commissioner that he has 
consulted with the clients and advised them in certain particu-
lars, when he knows the statement is not true. 
A few months after formation of the league, in September 
and November of 1937, the two representative suits, Adams 
i~ " 
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and Byl, supra, were filed, and in each a request was made 
for an allowance of counsel fees for attorneys of record for 
the named plaintiffs therein and others of similar status who' 
would benefit in the event of successful prosecution of the liti-
gation. Petitioner admittedly knew at all times of the pen-
dency of these suits, but claims that he did not know of the 
prayer for and granting of counsel fees until after the final 
decision on appeal, and hence did not know that some memo 
bel's of the league would be liable for such fees. He testified 
that a .,Copy of the complaint which he borrowed from attor-
ney Schellbach did not contain a prayer for fees, and that he 
never examined the record in the courthouse. He said that he 
had prepared a complaint on behalf of league members, but 
had never filed it as he decided instead to watch the progress 
of the pending suits, ' 
In describing the serviceR rendered for league members. 
other than those already mentioned, petitioner testified that 
he investigated court proceedings, had six or eight telephone 
conversatiom~ and one or two personal interviews with the 
original attorney for the commissioner; talked with a man in 
the office of counsel handling the Martin caReR: saw Mr. Schell· 
bach twice and talked with a man in his office: talked with 
the attorney who represented the commissioner in the lat.er 
stage of proceedings: did quite a bit of legal research; exam· 
ined the Martin files ana glanced through t.he Adams and By! 
fileR in Mr. Schellbach's office. The board found that pet.i-
tioner "did not file any suit on behalf of the members of !laid 
league, but did inve!ltig.ate and 'kept himself informed concern-
ing the progress of the litigation that would be dete1'lllinative 
of the rig-htFi of the memberFi of said league." Petitioner as-
~erts that a "mere reading of the findings is apt to lead to 
the concluFiion that rhe 1 nerformedno !'!ervices Tor memherg 
of the league, but a reading of rhis1 testimony completely 
refute!l such a conclusion ", The record shoWR. however. t.hat 
the finding~ give petitioner the benefit I)f every. inference 1)1" 
implication to which he is entitled with respect to the rendi· 
'tion of !lervices. Other than taking steps to put in motion the 
procedure by which he might obtain contingent fee cont.racts 
and gain thp "dvantage of "lolicitation work done hy Betts. 
petitioner. ~n far as shown. oio nothing other than to follow 
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nation undertook to collect such fees as it was possible for him to secure. 
Within a few months after creation of the league, the board 
found, Betts abandoned his activities in connection with it. 
. He did not see petitioner after 1939. and his whereabouts 
at the time of the hearings herein were unknown. He had 
delivered to petitioner aU agreements signed at hiR solicita-
tion. and aU initial paym~ntR had been divided equally be-
tween the two. fIe had also supplied a list of six or eight 
purported members of the league, other than Flynn. Dixon 
and White, but had not supplied contracts for some of them; 
in particular there were no contracts with W"hite, Wilson or Day. 
[2a] In August, 1941. this court rendered decisions favor-
able to theplaintiffl'l in the Martin. Adams and Byl cases. 
supra. Petitioner thereupon consulted with the Commissioner 
relative to requirements for presenting hiR claim for fees. 
On October 6. 1941. he sent the attornev for the commissioner 
a list of the members' he claimed to represent, and about two 
week.", later he mailed his alleged clients a letter reading in part: 
"For several years we have been handling the matter of 
. your claim . . . and we are glad to report that the California 
Supreme Oourt has finaIJy RURtained Our pORition .... No ef-
fort has been made heretofore to approve the claimR of such 
claimants aR vourRelf <In "lome form of proof of clHim will no 
douht he set up . '. and some meanR of identification. no 
douht. required beforp thp dividend distribution will be made 
... WE' will ('omml1nieatE' with you again and will do all 
we can to get your dividend to you at the earlieRt pOSRihlE' 
date. . . " Thp hoard found. contrary t.o thp finding of thp 
Local Committee. that pet.itionerinte'nded by this letter t.o 
deceive the claimants to whom he addresRed it. hy "cauRing 
said claimant.s to helievp that the deeision on Il,ppeal in the 
AdamR and By-I proceedings waR due to the efforts of r neti-
tionerJ and, t.hat r PE'titioner ) had actively participated or 
rendererl '!ervices in ~aid litigation." 
A reading of the letter, coupled with a consideration of 
the repreRentations which had been made upon the solicitation 
of memherq and thereaft.er. iR snffirient to '!how that the find-
ing is Rupnorted A letter of '1nlil'itl1tion "'ent out hy RpttR 
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sociate the members together "to press their claims in a simi-
lar suit"; that "our attorneys are already at work upon th~ 
matter." The agreements signed referred among other things 
to "bringing, maintaining, settling, and compromising such 
proceedings, and legal actions as may be deemed necessary or 
advisable to protect my intereRts." and provided for reten-
tion by the attorney of "twenty percent of any recovery ob-
tained by or for me," and that "any costs allowed by the 
court and collected win be refunded to the subscribel'E!pro 
rata." In September. 1938, petitioner ha.d written:. "We 
have been following certain litigation which'is pending in th~ 
Appellate Oourt. have prepared a suit onbehal:f of the de-
positors we represent. including yourself. and ultimately upon 
the termination of the litigation on appeal we.feel confident 
that a recovery will be had in your behalf .•• /' In the light 
of these previous assurances and representations the stat~ 
.ment.in the letter of October 6th. that "For several years. we 
have been handling the matter of your claim .•• and we are, 
glad to report that the California Supreme Court had, finally 
RURtained our position .' ." could only mean 'that the SUCCesR-
luI termination of the litigation waFl due in Rome part to the 
efforts or active participation of petitioner. 
[8] On December 9. 1941. the attorney for the commiR~ 
sioner advised petitioner by letter that "some of the share: 
holders, by virtue of the fact that their rights were eRtabliAhed 
through a representative suit. are burdened with,the payment 
of a prorata '1hare of the attornev!l' feeR. in the amount 
13%% of their ~laimFl .. " and 'Tor further inTonnation 
the letter referred petitioner to MeRRl'E!. ~chel1bach. etal. 
The following day petitioner adviRed the commil'l~ioner that 
he repreRented eig-ht named clientR whose claims aggregated 
$9.318.03. and on December 20th hE'a~ainwrote thecommiR~ 
sioner ~aying . 'WE' have a contingent percentage interest iii 
each of the claim", ., in the lil'lt that we recently l'Ient to you. 
and would RuggeRt . making the check payable to the I'Ihare-
holderR and the attorney. thul'l necel'lRitating the endorsement 
of the check by hoth." 
On March 6. 1942. in an effort to get further authorizations, 
petitioner wrote hiR alleged clientFl ",tating: "The litigation 
in this matter hal'l finally ended and the ... CommiR..sioner 11'1 
about to apply to the {'·ourt for directionFl as to distributing 
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from the people whom we are representing which can be de-
posited in court showing our authorization to make the neces-
sary appearance!' in your behalf. I am enclosing a letter 
which I would appreciate your having signed .... " 
Of the list of eight alleged clientR submitted by petitioner, 
four had never signed !'mbRcript.ion agreements. and only one 
had indicated any willingness to cooperate or join the league. 
Two others on the list. Robt. and Anna Scholz. proteRted to 
the commissioner that although they had <;hmed. it wa!' by 
misunderstanding as to their "real rcprm;cntative. ,. for they 
had previously fligned up with the Schellhach group. 1'hese 
two, and two others, were liable for counRel feeR in the repre-
sentative suits. 1'he hoard found that petitioner knew. or in 
the proper performance of hi!' dutieR aR counsel for the league 
should have known. of the award bv the court of ('onnRel feeR 
to attorneys of record in the repre~entative actiom;. and that 
petitioner· did not at any time advise the member~ of the 
league who were '4uhject to such liability that the,\' would 
have to pay fee1' awarded in the representative action1' in 
addition to petitioner'~ fee. 
Petitioner argue~ that these findings are unsupported be-
cause he repeatedly tef'tified to hi~ lack of knowledge or recol. 
lection of knowledge of fecR in the repref'entative ~uitR until 
after the deci~ion on appeal when he wa~ advi~ed by t.he at. 
torney for the commi~~ioner. But even if petitioner waR not 
initially aware of the prayer for and award 0f feef< in t.he 
repre~entativp snitR hec:lll~p of hi~ failure to examine nocu, 
ments of recorn. he wa~ "pecificalJ? advi~eil of them b:v the 
commi,"sioner'~ letter of no('emher 9th, Vet he ilid not men-
tion the matter to hi!" ('Iient". even while "ali citing' further 
authorization:;: from them, 1'0 tho~e who faileil to repl? t.o 
hi~ above mentionNl lpttf'l' 0f March nth. he <lent n follow np 
about March 1 ~th. ~a?ing among' other thing'R: " . 1'hi~ caRe 
will probably hp heard in the very near fnture amI T wouk! 
appreciate it if von won](1 'lend the authnrizntion hack to me 
at the earlieRt pOR~ihle moment." As a rel'l1llt 0f nrntel'ltf' hy 
some of the A.llege<i ('lientR. the commi!'l!'lloner wrote netitioner 
that unlesf> matter~ were ad.in~ted at once he would he for('ecl 
to interplead all partie>: with whom 'Iettloment hail not heen 
made 0f the eight a.lleg-ed elientR. three <:ecured A waiver of 
petitiOllPr'~ ('laim, ()TIe compromiRed. nne naid 11ndpr proteRt. 
and the other three submitted to his demands. In all he 
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received an estimated $100 from his 2% per cent of the initial 
5 per cent payments, and between· $300 and $400 from the' 
remaining 15 per cent collections. 
But petitioner contend~ that even if he had known of the 
award of fees in the repreRentative suits, it was not incumbent 
upon him to advise members of the league as to their liability 
to pay fees in a suit to which they never'voluntarily became 
parties. The obviou~ answer i~ that petitioner's clientR. ",ere 
looking to him to proteet their intereRt~. and not to be required 
to pay double fees of 131,~ Del' cent to one set of attorneys and 
20 per cent to another. 1'hi~ eourt in the AdamR ease said 
(18 Cal.2d 487. 489) : "InaRmuch as theRe are representative 
actions, brought on behalf of named plaintiff~ and otherR simi-
larly Rituated but not represented in correRpondinP.' litigation. 
any award of counsel fee~ Rhould be paid out of that portion 
of the fund recoveredbv thoRe for whose benefit these action~ 
were brought." Petitio~er. RO far a~ shown. made no effort 
to either associate himself a~ cOlm~el of record in the repre-
sentative suitR or to institute "corresponding litigation ,. on 
behalf of hiR clients. but claimed the right t.o hi" 20 pel' cent 
contingent fef> merely for "following" the Rucce~sful course of 
thf> suitf' prosecuted hy others, thUR impreRsing Rome of his 
clientR with double liahility. [2b] In good faith he Rhonld 
have advised them of the facts. ~o they could have decidfln 
whether they wIRhpd hi" additional renrflsentation. and should 
not have misled them by the indefinite tenor of hi" cor· 
respondence on the Rllh.iect of whether he actual1y instituted 
1 itig-ation in th eir hehalf 
[4] 'rhe hoard found that it was not true that petitioner 
-:olicited employment t.hroug-h Bett~ hut that it was true t.hat 
he ~oliciten legnl emplovment hv Marv E. Wilson. and that 
ander a claim which he 'knew to 'hf> un~arranted he sought to 
compel the payment of leg-al fee" hY Mary E. Wil~on.and 
C:ynthia Day. who had not <;ig-neil <;ubsl'ription ag-reementR 01' 
otherwise become obligated eithpr to t.he leag-ue or to him, 
Petitioner contend~ that t.heRP adverse findings cannot bp 
reconeileo with findings in hi~ favor to thf> flffect that he rlid 
not know that thf> league and committee were not bona fide: 
that he did not ~olicit through Bett~: that "among the holn-
ers of mem bership "harc!' solieited by BeUR by letter was 
Mary Estelle Wilson .•• "; and that it was after the solici-
36 
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tation by Betts that Miss Wilson had her first contact and 
conversation with petitioner. 
But the evidence shows that when Miss Wilson and a friend 
called on petitioner in response to the Betts letter, they 
"merely told him after listening we would let him know later, 
and when we got outside we both agreed we did not think 
he had to offer what the other group in San Jose had to offer, 
and that ended the matter." Notwithstanding this, petitioner 
claims he believed that as a result of the interview Miss Wil-
son had retained him. When asked: "Referring to the two 
depositors. White and Wilson, weren't you interested in de-
termining in some more exact fashion than just the statement 
from Mr. Betts what clients you represented in this matterY", 
petitioner replied, "Well, 1 thought it was a bit odd there 
weren't contracts from them but 1 assumed in the confusion 
and handling of these various papers' he had misplaced them 
or lost them, and there would be no reason for me to have the 
names on the list unless he had at one time contracts from 
them." Although petitioner never saw Betts after 1939, he 
continued until the spring of 1942, to assert his claims for 
fees against Miss Wilson and the other alleged clients. 
The record shows ample support for the findings and con-
clusions of the board, and no good reason has been advanced 
for refusing to follow its recommendation. 
It is ordered that petitioner be and he is hereby suspended 
from the practice of the law for six months, this order to 
become effective thirty days from the filing of this decision. 
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WELLS FARGO & COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, 
v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Re-
spondent. 
[So F. No. 16890. In Bank. Oct. 24, 1944.] 
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant, 
v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Re-
spondent. 
[1] Judgments-Collateral Attack-Motions to Vacate Judgments. 
-A motion to vacate a judgment, made after the expiration 
of the six-month period allowed in Code Civ. Proc., § 473, is 
governed by the rules applicable to collateral attack. 
[2] ld.-Collateral Attack-Limiting Consideration to Matter Ap-
parent on Record.-In the absence of extrinsic fraud or mis-
take, a judgment which is collaterally attacked cannot be set 
aside unless it is void on its face. 
[3] ld.-Collateral Attack-Presumptions.-Every presumption is 
in favor of the validity of a judgment, and any condition of 
facts consistent with its validity will be presumed to have 
existed, rather than one which will defeat it. 
[4] ld.-Collateral Attack-Erroneous Judgment.-A mere erro-
neous decision on a question of law, even though the error 
appears on the face of the record, does not make the judgment 
void, if the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of 
the person of the defendant. 
[5] Dismissal-Delay in Bringing Action to Trial-Delay Exceed-
ing Five Years.-Since a statute cannot cut off a right of ac-
tion without allowing a reasonable time after its effective date 
for the exercise of the right, Code ClV. Proe., § 583, which be-
came effective in its present form in 1933, and which makes the 
filing of the action the starting point of the five-year period, 
[4] See 15 Cal.Jur. 83; 31 Am.Jur. 181. 
[5] Construction and application of statutory requirement that 
action should be brought to trial within specified time, note, 112 
A.L.R. 1158. See, also, 9 Ca1.Jur. 542. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 282(3); [2] Judgments, 
§290; [3] Judgments, §296; [4] Judgments, §330; [5] Dismissal, 
§ 64; [6] Judgments, § 335; [7] Attorneys, § 55; [8] Attorneys, 
§ 62; [9] Attorneys, § 46; [10, 12] Taxation, § 290; [11] Judg-
ments, § 330(2); [13] Judgments, § 331; [14] Costs, § 2. 
